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The task used most widely to assess recognition of false belief in self and others is the 
‘Smarties’ unexpected contents task.  Amongst individuals with and without autism, 
the Self and Other-person test questions of this task are of an equivalent level of 
difficulty.  However, a potential confound with this task may allow the Self test 
question to be passed without false belief competence.  Three groups of participants 
(with autism, developmental disability and typical development) undertook a new 
unexpected contents task which did not suffer from this confound.  The main finding 
was that participants with autism performed significantly less well on the Self test 
question than the Other-person test question on this new task.  Individuals with autism 
may have greater difficulty representing their own beliefs than the beliefs of other 
people. 
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‘What did I say?’ versus ‘What did I think?’:  Attributing false beliefs to self amongst 
children with and without autism. 
 
An individual is said to possess a ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) if they attribute mental 
states both to others and to self in order to explain and predict behaviour (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1986). The majority of research on ToM has focused on ‘reading other 
minds’, with attribution of mental states to self relatively neglected in the literature.  
The task used most widely to assess mental state understanding in self and others has 
been the unexpected contents false belief task (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987).  
In the original and best known version of this task, a participant is shown a Smarties 
tube and is asked what they think is inside.  Having responded that they believe there 
are Smarties/sweets inside, the participant is shown that the tube actually contains a 
pencil.  The tube is then resealed with the pencil inside and the participant is asked 
two ‘false belief’ test questions.  The ‘Other-person’ test question requires the 
participant to predict what another person, who has not yet seen the actual contents of 
the Smarties tube, would believe was inside (before they were allowed to look).  This 
test question is designed to assess the participant’s awareness of another person’s 
false belief.  Participants are also asked what they, themselves, thought the tube 
contained before they were allowed to look inside.  This is the ‘Self’ test question and 
is thought to assess the participant’s awareness of their own prior false belief.   
There is substantial evidence that, in typical development, the Self and Other-
person test questions from the Smarties task are of an equivalent level of difficulty.  
Wellman, Cross and Watson’s (2001, p.665) meta-analysis of false belief task 
performance in typically developing (TD) children concluded that:   
 
The essential age trajectory for tasks requiring judgements of someone else’s 
false belief is paralleled by an identical age trajectory for children’s 
judgements of their own false beliefs.  Young children, for example, are just as 
incorrect at attributing a false belief to themselves as they are at attributing it 
to others. 
 
At the cognitive level of description, autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterised 
by marked deficits in ToM (e.g., Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998).   
Those studies that have incorporated tasks designed to assess awareness of mental 
states in self and others have tended to find similar patterns of performance to those 
observed amongst TD children.  On the Smarties task, individuals with ASD tend to 
perform as poorly on the Self test question as they do on the Other-person test 
question (Baron-Cohen, 1991, 1992; Fisher, Happé & Dunn, 2006; Russell & Hill, 
2001).  However, a potential shortcoming of the Smarties Self task may provide 
individuals with ASD the opportunity for success despite lacking false belief 
competence.  The difficulty with the Self task is that it involves an initial 
demonstration in which participants are required to state their (false) belief about the 
contents of the tube before the actual contents are revealed and before the critical test 
questions are asked.  In this instance, it is possible that the Self question of the 
Smarties task could be answered correctly merely by recalling what was previously 
said rather than what was previously believed.    
This sort of ‘memory for statement’ strategy could be used by individuals with 
ASD to ‘hack out’ a solution to the Self question on the Smarties task even when they 
lack a grasp of their own (or others’) mental states.  Several researchers have 
cautioned that success on false belief tasks amongst children with ASD may not 
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reflect the same underlying cognitive processes that operate in individuals who do not 
have ASD (e.g., Bloom & German, 2000; Happé, 1995).  As Leslie and Roth (1993) 
note, it is important that surface level behaviour is distinguished from the mental 
architecture underlying behaviour.   
The idea that individuals with ASD employ a compensatory ‘memory for 
statement’ strategy to succeed on the Self question of the Smarties task is somewhat 
suggested by evidence that their performance on this question is dramatically 
improved when they are asked specifically about their original statement about the 
contents of the box than when they are asked about their original belief.  In studies by 
Perner, Frith, Leslie, and Leekam (1989), and Leslie and Thaiss (1992), children with 
ASD and TD children were given a standard task in which they were initially asked to 
state what they believed was inside the box, and were subsequently asked the critical 
Self and Other-person test questions.  Now, in the studies of false belief 
understanding cited above (e.g., Fisher et al., 2006) participants were asked what they 
thought was inside the box before they looked (Self question) and what another 
person will think is inside the box before they look (Other-person question).  
However, in the studies by Perner et al. and Leslie and Thaiss, the Self and Other-
person test questions were phrased subtly differently, participants being asked what 
they said was inside the box before they looked (Self question) and what another 
person will say is inside before they are allowed to look (Other-person question).  
This apparently simple change in the wording of the test questions resulted in children 
with ASD, but not TD participants, performing significantly less well on the Other-
person test question than on the Self test question.   
The results of Perner et al. (1989) and Leslie and Thaiss (1992) highlight the 
possibility that individuals with autism are able to recall what they stated was inside 
the familiar container without necessarily grasping this statement as a reflection of 
their belief about the box’s contents.  As Leslie and Thaiss (1992, p.239, original 
emphasis) suggest, individuals with ASD may “not relate the uttering of a sentence to 
the speaker’s underlying propositional attitude: for example they will not connect 
assertion with belief”.  Supporting this argument, Roth and Leslie (1991) found that in 
a modified false belief task TD children, but not children with ASD, reported that a 
speaker believes what they say.  
Given these findings, it seems a reasonable concern that asking children with 
ASD to state what they believe to be in the Smarties tube before asking them the false 
belief test question might lead to artificially inflated levels of performance, in the 
absence of true false belief competence.   On this basis, the results from previous 
studies employing the Smarties task amongst children with ASD might be questioned.  
Whereas these studies have observed either parallel performance across the Self and 
Other-person test questions (e.g., Fisher et al., 2006) or an advantage on the Self 
question over the Other-person question (e.g., Perner et al., 1989), perhaps individuals 
with ASD would have greater difficulty representing their own false beliefs if the task 
demands of the Self and Other questions were better equated.   
This latter prediction might strike the reader as unusual given that most 
theories of ToM suggest either that a concept of belief is acquired for self and others 
in parallel (Gopnik, 1993; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994; Leslie, 1987), or that knowledge 
of one’s own beliefs emerges prior to, and forms the basis of, knowledge of others’ 
beliefs (Goldman, 1993; Harris, 1992).  However, if one takes the competence-
performance framework seriously, there are grounds to believe that reasoning about 
beliefs in self might engage different processes to those involved in reasoning about 
beliefs in others (German & Leslie, 2000).    The competence-performance framework 
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is usually invoked to support the argument that typically developing children prior to 
age 4 years have false belief competence, but that performance factors (e.g., executive 
limitations) prevent them from expressing this competence in false belief tasks (Leslie 
& Thaiss, 1992).  However, this argument cuts both ways: if it is assumed that many 
children with ASD have diminished false belief competence but ‘hack out’ solutions 
to false belief tasks using compensatory (performance) strategies (Happé, 1995), then 
different processing routes for self and other could theoretically be seen amongst 
these individuals also.   Indeed, for an individual with only partial knowledge of 
beliefs, it may be easier to identify a false belief in another person, whose behaviour 
is readily observable, than in oneself whose behaviour is less visually accessible.   
In an attempt to test this hypothesis, we devised an unexpected contents task – 
the ‘Plasters’ (band-aid) task – in which participants did not verbalise their beliefs 
about the contents of a familiar container before they were asked the false belief test 
questions.   In this modified task, a plasters box and two other, unrelated containers 
were placed in a convenient location within reaching distance of the participant, but 
out of the experimenter’s reach.  The experimenter pretended that he had cut his 
finger and so asked the participant if s/he could get him a plaster (pointing in the 
direction of the containers).  The participant obligingly attempted to fetch a plaster but 
unexpectedly found that the plasters box contained birthday cake candles.  Once the 
participant had discovered the actual contents of the box, they were asked the Self and 
Other-person test questions, following the standard procedure of the traditional 
Smarties task.   
 The crucial manipulation in the Plasters task is that participants never 
explicitly verbalise their belief that the plasters box contains plasters although, by 
selecting this box when asked to help the experimenter, participants demonstrated 
their false belief unambiguously.  Therefore, success on the Self test question of this 
Plasters task is not possible through a simple ‘memory for statement’ strategy since 
no statement was ever made.  Rather, an individual must recognise and recall their 
false belief.  It is important to note that the Other-person test question in this Plasters 
task was of the same form as in the traditional Smarties task.  The aim of the current 
study was not to adapt the unexpected contents task per se, but to better equate the 
demands of the Self and Other-person aspects of the task.   
An anonymous reviewer of the manuscript kindly brought to our attention an 
early study of false belief understanding amongst TD children by Bartsch and 
Wellman (1989) in which a task with similarities to the Plasters task was employed.  
In Bartsch and Wellman’s study, participants discovered that a familiar box (in one 
case, a plasters box) did not contain its usual contents, the typical contents instead 
being located in a nearby, unmarked box.   Participants were then asked, for instance, 
(a) where a puppet who needed a plaster would look for the item (prediction question) 
and; (b) why a puppet who needed a plaster would look in the plasters box 
(explanation question).  There are notable similarities between Bartsch and 
Wellman’s experimental procedures and those involved in the current Plasters task.  
However, the focus in Bartsch and Wellman’s study was upon the relative difficulty 
of predicting versus explaining another’s false belief, not upon the relative difficulty 
of recognising false beliefs in self versus others.  As such, participants in their study 
were not asked the critical test question about own false beliefs, which was pivotal to 
the current investigation.  Therefore, Bartsch and Wellman’s results aren’t considered 
here, although the similarity in procedures to those employed in the current study is 
noted.  
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The Plasters task was completed by a group of individuals with ASD, a 
comparison group of individuals with developmental disability (DD), equated for age 
and verbal ability, and a group of young TD children who were of an age at which 
most would be on the cusp of passing traditional false belief tasks.  All of the TD 
children, as well as a sub-sample of children with ASD, were also given a traditional 
Smarties task.   
Two specific predictions were made about participants’ performance within 
each of the Plasters and Smarties tasks.  Firstly, within the new Plasters task, it was 
predicted that participants with ASD would be unique in performing significantly less 
well on the Self test question than the Other-person test question.  Parallel 
performance across the two test questions was predicted amongst both DD and TD 
participants.  Secondly, within the original Smarties task, parallel performance across 
the Self and Other-person test questions was predicted amongst all participants, in line 
with previous findings using the same methodology. 
Two specific predictions were also made about participants’ performance 
across the Plasters and Smarties tasks.  Firstly, it was predicted that participants with 
ASD would be unique in performing significantly less well on the Plasters Self 
question than the Smarties Self question.  Equivalent levels of performance across the 
Smarties Self and Plasters Self questions were predicted amongst TD participants.  
Secondly, given that the Other-person aspect of the Plasters task was identical to the 
Other-person aspect of the Smarties task, equivalent levels of performance across the 






Ethical approval for this research was obtained from the joint South London and 
Maudsley NHS Trust/Institute of Psychiatry Research Ethics Committee.  Fifty-two 
children with ASD, 25 children with DD and 41 TD children participated in the study, 
after parents/guardians had given written, informed consent for their children to be 
included.  The participants in the ASD group had received formal diagnoses, by a 
trained psychiatrist or pediatrician, of autistic disorder (n = 47), Asperger’s disorder 
(n = 3) or atypical autism/pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified 
(PDD-NOS; n = 2) according to established criteria (DSM-IV-TR, American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000; ICD-10, World Health Organisation, 1993).  All 
participants in this group attended specialist autism schools, which required a 
diagnosis of autism, Asperger’s syndrome or atypical autism/PDD-NOS for entry into 
the school.  The DD group consisted of 25 children with general learning disability of 
unknown origin who attended UK schools for children with special educational needs.  
Any DD participant who was described in their statement of special educational needs 
or by their head teacher as having any social-communication difficulties was excluded 
from the study.  This allows confidence that comparison participants in the current 
study did not have autism-related symptoms.  Finally, 41 TD participants were 




Baseline verbal abilities were assessed by an appropriate measure for the 
developmental level of the participant.  The verbal abilities of 26 (out of 52) children 
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with ASD and 18 (out of 25) comparison children were determined by performance 
on the Vocabulary and Information subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children – Third Edition UK (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991).  The verbal IQ estimate 
gained from this short form has high reliability (Sattler, 1992).  Because the lowest 
test age-equivalent offered by the WISC-III is 6 years 2 months, the verbal mental age 
(VMA) of any participant who fell below this level on either of the verbal subtests 
could not be calculated.  Under these circumstances, participants were administered 
the British Picture Vocabulary Scale – Second Edition (BPVS; Dunn et al., 1997), 
which offers test age-equivalents down to 2 years 11 months.  In this instance, the 
verbal abilities of 26 (out of 52) children with ASD and 7 (out of 25) DD children 
were assessed with the BPVS.  Of the 52 children with ASD who completed the 
Plasters task, a sub-sample of 19 also received a traditional (‘Smarties’) unexpected 
contents task, as did each of the 41 TD participants.  DD participants received the 
Plasters task only.   
The participant characteristics of each group, including the ‘Smarties sub-
sample’ of 19 ASD participants, are presented in Table 1.  Statistical analyses showed 
that the ASD and DD groups were adequately equated on all variables: CA: t(75) = -
1.80, p = .08, r = .21; VMA: t(75) = -0.72, p = .47, r = .08; VIQ: t(75) = 1.72, p = .09, 
r = .20.  
 
(Table 1 about here)  
 
Given that some ASD and DD participants received the WISC-III whilst others 
received the BPVS, independent t-tests were conducted on each sub-sample to ensure 
adequacy of matching in each case.  ASD and DD participants who received the 
WISC-III were equated adequately for CA and VMA (all ts < 0.81, all ps > .42).  
However, in this WISC-III sub-sample, participants with ASD had significantly 
higher VIQs (M = 79.12, SD = 17.83) than DD participants (M = 69.39, SD = 12.00) 
(t = 2.02, p = .05, r = .30).  ASD and DD participants who received the BPVS were 
adequately equated for CA, VMA and VIQ (all ts < 0.63, all ps > .53).   
 
Design and Procedures 
 
Amongst those participants who received both the new Plasters task and the 
traditional Smarties task, the order of task completion was counterbalanced.   
 
Standard Smarties task.  The participant was shown a Smarties tube, with 
which all children in UK schools are familiar.  They were asked “What is in here?”  
All participants said “Smarties” or “Chocolate”.  The tube was then opened to reveal 
that it really contained a pencil.  The pencil was placed back inside the tube which 
was then resealed.  The participant was then asked the Self test question (“Before you 
looked in the tube, what did you think was inside?”), the Other-person test question 
(“Later on I am going to show this tube to your teacher.  He/she hasn’t seen inside 
here though.  What will he/she think is in there before he/she looks inside?”) and a 
reality control question (“What’s inside the tube, really?”).  These questions were 
asked in a fixed order across all participants.  Only participants who passed the reality 
control question were included in the study. 
 
Plasters task.  Three containers (an empty ‘Pringles’ crisps tube, an empty 
mints box, and a plasters box which contained birthday cake candles) were placed in a 
 7 
convenient location within reaching distance of the participant, but out of the 
experimenter’s reach.  The experimenter pretended that he had a cut on his little 
finger and asked the participant to get him a plaster: “Oh, I have got this little cut on 
my finger [experimenter points to his finger without showing it directly, up close, to 
the participant].  Could you get me a plaster? [Experimenter points in the direction of 
the three containers]”.  The participant then picked up the plasters box and opened it 
to find birthday cake candles inside.  If the participant did not open the box 
spontaneously the experimenter requested: “Could you just get one out for me?”.  
Once the participant had discovered the real contents of the plasters box, the 
experimenter replaced the candles and resealed the box.  The participant was then 
asked the Self test question (“Before you looked in the box, what did you think was 
inside?”), the Other-person test question (“Later on I am going to show this box to 
your teacher.  He/she hasn’t seen inside here though.  What will he/she think is in 
there before he/she looks inside?”) and a reality control question (“What’s inside the 
box, really?”).  These questions were asked in a fixed order across all participants.  




Preliminary Between-Subjects analysis 
On the Plasters task, 27/52 (51.9%) participants with ASD passed the Self test 
question compared to 23/25 (92.0%) participants with DD.  This between-group 
difference was significant, ²(1) = 11.91, p = .001,  = .39.  Also, 36/52 (69.2%) 
participants with ASD passed the Plasters Other-person test question compared to 
22/25 (88.0%) participants with DD.  This difference was also significant ²(1) = 




In order to assess the relative difficulty of the Plasters and Smarties test questions, 
both within and between tasks, patterns of within-participant performance were 
explored using McNemar tests. 
 
Plasters task: self versus other-person.  Table 2 shows the contingency 
between performance on the Plasters Self and Other-person test questions by ASD, 
DD, and TD participants.  Participants who performed inconsistently across the two 
questions, passing only one of the two, are highlighted in bold.   
To reiterate, the critical prediction tested through this analysis that previous 
findings of parallel performance amongst participants with ASD across the Self and 
Other-person test questions of the Smarties task may have been confounded.  Because 
children with ASD could plausibly pass the Self question of the traditional task, in the 
absence of false belief competence, by recalling their statement that the tube 
contained Smarties, their performance on the Self question could have been 
artificially inflated.  Therefore, it was predicted that on the Plasters task (where no 
initial statement of the participant’s belief is made) participants with ASD would 
perform significantly less well on the Self test question than the Other-person test 
question. 
On the other hand, it was speculated that individuals who do not have ASD 
rely rarely on a compensatory strategy of recalling their previous statement on the 
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Smarties task.  Hence, their performance across the Plasters Self and Other-person test 
questions should be equivalent, in line with their performance on the traditional task.   
The results were that amongst participants with ASD, 11/52 (21.2%) failed the 
Plasters Self question despite passing the Plasters Other-person question, and 2/52 
(3.8%) participants showed the opposite pattern of performance.  Amongst 
participants with ASD, the Plasters Self question was significantly more difficult than 
the Plasters Other question, McNemar’s p = .02.   
Amongst participants with DD, 1/25 (4.0%) failed the Plasters Self question 
despite passing the Plasters Other-person question, and 2/25 (8.0%) showed the 
opposite pattern of performance.  Amongst participants with DD, the Plasters Self and 
Other test questions did not differ significantly in difficulty, McNemar’s p = .63. 
Amongst TD participants, 7/41 (17.1%) failed the Plasters Self question 
despite passing the Plasters Other-person question, and 2/41 (4.9%) showed the 
opposite pattern of performance.  Amongst TD participants, the Plasters Self and 
Other test questions did not differ significantly in difficulty, McNemar’s p = .18.  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
Smarties task: self versus other-person.  Table 3 shows the contingency 
between performance on the Smarties Self and Other-person test questions by ASD 
and TD participants.  The aim of this analysis was to confirm that participants from 
each group were typical in finding the two test questions from this traditional task of 
an equivalent level of difficulty.   
 Amongst participants with ASD, 4/19 (21.1%) failed the Smarties Self 
question despite passing the Smarties Other-person question, and 3/19 (15.8%) 
participants showed the opposite pattern of performance.  Amongst participants with 
ASD, the Smarties Self and Other-person test questions did not differ significantly in 
difficulty, McNemar’s p > .99. 
Amongst TD participants, 2/41 (4.9%) failed the Smarties Self question 
despite passing the Smarties Other-person question, and 5/41 (12.2%) showed the 
opposite pattern of performance.  Amongst TD participants, the Smarties Self and 
Other test questions did not differ significantly in difficulty, McNemar’s p = .45.  
  
(Table 3 about here) 
 
Plasters self versus Smarties self.  Table 4 shows the contingency between 
performance on the Plasters Self and Smarties Self test questions by ASD and TD 
participants.  To reiterate, the critical prediction tested through this analysis is that 
individuals with ASD, but not those without ASD, use a compensatory strategy of 
recalling their own statement to succeed on the Smarties Self question in the absence 
of false belief competence.  Therefore, it was predicted that performance on the 
Plasters Self question (on which success is not possible through such a strategy) 
would be significantly poorer than the Smarties Self question amongst participants 
with ASD only.    
Amongst participants with ASD, 4/19 (21.1%) failed the Plasters Self question 
despite passing the Smarties Self question, and 1/19 (5.3%) participants showed the 
opposite pattern of performance.  Amongst this sub-sample of participants with ASD, 
the Plasters Self and Smarties Self test questions did not differ significantly in 
difficulty, McNemar’s p = .45.   
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Amongst TD participants, 9/41 (22.0%) failed the Plasters Self question 
despite passing the Smarties Self question, and 1/41 (2.1%) showed the opposite 
pattern of performance.  Amongst TD participants, the Plasters Self question was 
significantly more difficult than the Smarties Self question, McNemar’s p = .02. 
 To summarise, contrary to predictions, typically developing participants found 
the Self question of the Smarties task significantly less difficult than the Self question 
of the Plasters task.  Also contrary to predictions, participants with ASD did not 
perform significantly less well on the Plasters Self question than on the Smarties Self 
question.   
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
Plasters other-person versus Smarties other-person.  Table 5 shows the 
contingency between performance on the Plasters Other-person and Smarties Other-
person test questions by ASD and TD participants.  The aim of this analysis was to 
confirm that the Plasters task was not more difficult than the Smarties task per se.  
Given that the Other-person aspect of the Plasters task was identical to the Other-
person aspect of the Smarties task, it was predicted that equivalent levels of 
performance would be seen across each task amongst all participants.   
Amongst participants with ASD, 3/19 (15.8%) failed the Plasters Other-person 
question despite passing the Smarties Other-person question, and 1/19 (5.3%) 
participants showed the opposite pattern of performance.  Amongst participants with 
ASD, the Plasters Other-person and Smarties Other-person test questions did not 
differ significantly in difficulty, McNemar’s p = .63.   
Amongst TD participants, 4/41 (9.8%) failed the Plasters Other-person 
question despite passing the Smarties Other-person question, and 4/41 (9.8%) showed 
the opposite pattern of performance.  Amongst TD participants, the Plasters Other-
person and Smarties Other-person test questions did not differ significantly in 
difficulty, McNemar’s p > .99.  
 




This study explored the effects of removing a potential confound from the traditional 
Smarties false belief task that may have allowed the Self test question (supposedly 
assessing awareness of one’s own false belief) to be passed in the absence of a 
representational ToM.  The format of the new ‘Plasters’ false belief task did not 
require participants to verbalise their own (false) belief about the contents of a 
container prior to being asked the usual Self test question.  Therefore, success on the 
Self question of this task must reflect an awareness of one’s own prior belief, as 
opposed to one’s prior statement. 
 In line with the main prediction of the study, participants with ASD found it 
significantly more difficult to report their own prior false belief than to predict the 
false belief of another person on the new Plasters task (see Table 2).  In contrast, 
participants who did not have ASD, whether they had developmental disability or not, 
performed consistently across the Plasters Self and Other test questions.  This 
suggests that the majority of individuals who do not have ASD are not restricted to a 
strategy of recalling their previous statement to succeed on the Self test question of 
the unexpected contents task.  For these individuals, success on the Self test question 
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of the traditional unexpected contents task largely reflects an accurate representation 
of their prior false belief.   
In accordance with this reasoning, the other predictions of the study were that 
(a) in keeping with other studies, all participants who undertook the Smarties task 
would perform equivalently across the Self and Other-person test questions; (b) 
participants with ASD would find the Self question of the Plasters task significantly 
harder than the Self question of the Smarties task because they could not rely on a 
‘memory for statement’ strategy to succeed on the Self test question of the Plasters 
task; (c)  all participants would perform equivalently across the Other-person question 
on the Plasters task and the Other-person question on the Smarties task, since both 
tasks were structurally equivalent 
In line with predictions (a) and (c), amongst ASD and TD participants the 
Smarties Self and Other-person test questions were of an equivalent level of 
difficulty, as were the Plasters Other-person and Smarties Other-person questions.  
Importantly, this latter finding confirms that is finding confirms that the Plasters and 
Smarties tasks were equated with respect to the demands involved in answering the 
Other-person test questions.   
However, contrary to the final critical prediction of the study, TD children, 
and not participants with ASD, performed significantly less well on the Plasters Self 
question than on the Smarties Self question.  This final result requires some 
unpacking.  With respect to the TD sample, the results were unambiguous; over 20% 
of the sample succeeded on the Smarties Self question despite failing on the Plasters 
Self question.  It appears that at least a proportion of TD children were supported on 
the Smarties task by the verbalisation of their (false) belief prior to the Self test 
question.  Although this result was not predicted at the outset of the study, the finding 
is perhaps understandable in light of previous research.  In studies by Mitchell and 
Lacohée (1991) and Charman and Lynggaard (1998), TD children were presented 
with a Smarties tube and asked what they thought was inside the box.  Having stated 
that they (falsely) believed that the box contained Smarties, participants were 
encouraged to select a picture of Smarties and then to post this into a post-box, 
provided by the experimenter.  Subsequently, in each study, participants performed 
significantly better on the Self question of this ‘picture posting’ version of the 
Smarties task than on the Self question of the traditional task (where no picture was 
posted).   
Although the interpretation of Mitchell and Lacohée’s (1991), and Charman 
and Lynggaard’s (1998) results are open to debate (see Perner, Baker & Hutton, 
1994), the studies highlight that the performance of TD children on the Smarties task 
can be scaffolded in meaningful ways through manipulations to the task’s structure.  
However, the current results suggest that although TD children can benefit from 
verbalising their false belief in the Smarties task (or, indeed, posting a picture as a 
representation of their belief), they do not rely on it: In the Plasters task the 
opportunity to pass the Self question though a ‘memory for statement’ strategy was 
not available, yet TD participants (unlike participants with ASD) nonetheless 
displayed parallel performance across the Self and Other-person test questions in line 
with their typical performance on the Smarties task.  If TD participants had been 
entirely reliant upon such a strategy then, like participants with ASD, they should 
have displayed an atypical profile of performance on the Plasters task.  
Regarding the failure of the current findings to confirm the prediction that 
participants with ASD would perform significantly less well on the Plasters Self 
question than the Smarties Self question, two points should be made.  Firstly, because 
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only a sub-sample of (n = 19) participants with ASD received both the Plasters and 
Smarties tasks, the power of the analysis to detect differences in performance across 
the tasks was limited.  This point is especially poignant when considering the 
characteristics of this particular sub-sample, who were developmentally relatively 
immature in terms of age (M = 7.49 years) and verbal ability (M = 5.24 years).  As a 
result, the majority (10/19; see Table 4) performed at floor, failing the Self question 
on each task, leaving little variation to detect statistical differences.  Therefore, the 
trend toward superior performance on the Smarties Self question than on the Plasters 
Self question may have become significant given a larger sample of participants.  In 
fact, looking at Table 4, the percentage of participants with ASD who showed the 
predicted pattern of performance (i.e., failing Plasters Self but passing Smarties Self; 
21.1%) was closely similar to the percentage of TD participants (22.0%) who showed 
this pattern of performance.  However, only in the larger sample of TD participants 
was the result statistically significant.   
Theoretically, this study provides the first evidence that individuals with ASD 
find it relatively more difficult to recognise their own (false) beliefs than the (false) 
beliefs of other people.  The claim here is not that an individual with ASD might 
possess a coherent conception of other’s beliefs but not of their own beliefs.  There 
are persuasive arguments why an individual with theory of mind competence must 
necessarily recognise mental states in themselves and others (Hobson, 1990, 2006; 
Leslie, 1987; Strawson, 1962).  However, individuals with ASD might be atypical in 
‘solving’ theory of mind problems through the application of a kind of rule-bound, 
cognitively-acquired heuristic, rather than through an affective system/capacity 
(Hermelin & O’Connor, 1985).  Under these circumstances, it may be more or less 
difficult to apply one’s (partial) knowledge (of beliefs) to the case of self or others.  
Indeed, as speculated above, rule-governed knowledge might be more easily acquired 
and/or applied to the case of others’ mental states than to one’s own.  After all, there 
would seem to be many more opportunities to observe the behaviour of others, and 
thereby learn ‘behaviour rules’ (Povinelli & Vonk, 2004) to predict their actions, than 
there are opportunities to observe one’s own behaviour and acquire such rules in 
relation to oneself.  This is not to say that there are no modes of first-person 
experience available to individuals with ASD that could provide relevant information 
about their own behaviour (Williams & Happé, in press a).  It is just that these forms 
of self-experience appear insufficient for acquiring a theory of (one’s own or 
another’s) mind (David et al., 2008). 
The results of this study suggest that we still have much to learn about how 
individuals with ASD come to represent their own mental states (see also Williams & 
Happé, in press b).  On a methodological note, the results also suggest that individuals 
with autism are able to pass the Self question on traditional unexpected contents tasks 
without reflecting on their own previous false beliefs.  Compared to the Smarties task, 
the Plasters task may be advantageous not only in terms of removing the identified 
confound with the traditional Self test question.  The task may also provide a more 
ecologically valid, ‘real-world’ test of false belief understanding amongst children 
with and without autism.  For these reasons, future studies aiming to assess false 
belief reasoning in self and other may benefit from implementing the Plasters task or 
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 ASD ASD: Smarties 
sub-sample 
DD TD 
n 52 19 25 41 
CA: years 11.15 (3.71) 7.49 (1.76) 12.33 (1.99) 4.47 (0.64) 
    
VMA:years    7.46 (2.76) 5.24 (1.15) 7.91 (2.11) 4.89 (1.24) 
    
VIQ 74.29 (18.52) 81.79 (15.04) 68.48 (11.00) 104.1 (9.76) 
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Table 2: Contingency between performance on the Plasters Self and Other-person test 
questions amongst ASD, DD, and TD participants.  Inconsistent performers are 
highlighted in bold. 
 Plasters OTHER 
 ASD  DD TD 
Plasters SELF Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail 
Pass 
25 2 21 2 16 2 
(48.1%) (3.8%) (84.0%) (8.0%) (39.0%) (4.9%) 
Fail 
11 14 1 1 7 16 
















Table 3: Contingency between performance on the Smarties Self and Other-person 
test questions amongst ASD and TD participants.  Inconsistent performers are 
highlighted in bold. 
 Smarties OTHER 
 ASD TD  
Smarties SELF Pass Fail Pass Fail 
Pass 
5 3 21 5 
(26.3%) (15.8%) (51.2%) (12.2%) 
Fail 
4 7 2 13 


















Table 4: Contingency between performance on the Smarties Self and the Plasters Self 
test questions amongst ASD and TD participants.  Inconsistent performers are 
highlighted in bold. 
 Smarties SELF 
 ASD TD 
Plasters SELF Pass Fail Pass Fail 
Pass 
4 1 17 1 
(21.1%) (5.3%) (41.5%) (2.1%) 
Fail 
4 10 9 14 


























Table 5: Contingency between performance on the Smarties Other-person and the 
Plasters Other-person test questions amongst ASD and TD participants.  Inconsistent 
performers are highlighted in bold. 
 Smarties OTHER 
 ASD TD 
Plasters OTHER Pass Fail Pass Fail 
Pass 
6 1 19 4 
(31.6%) (5.3%) (46.3%) (9.8%) 
Fail 
3 9 4 14 
(15.8%) (47.4%) (9.8%) (34.1%) 
 
